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WHO’S AFRAID OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
PARADIGM IN THE “WAR ON TERROR?”
Eric M. Freedman*
The criminal law paradigm is now, and has been from the be-
ginning, the right one to apply to the fight against terrorism.
The decision whether to respond to the individuals who per-
petrated 9/11 within a war or a criminal framework was from the
first day a policy choice.  If President Bush had been competently
advised by the White House Counsel, Alberto Gonzales, he would
have been told that there was a choice to be made and further told
that either decision would subject his actions to legal restraints.
What actually happened, as far as I can see, is that Gonzales
accepted Bush’s assertion “we are at war”1 as though this were a
description of objective empirical reality rather than a political de-
termination.  There almost certainly was not a well thought-out de-
cision to choose between the war and criminal paradigms,2  each of
which would involve benefits and burdens to the Executive Branch.
Instead, Gonzales seemingly shared his boss’s lay notion that “war”
is shorthand for “the President can do whatever he damn pleases,”
and the word went forth from the White House that the govern-
ment was to unleash all the forces at its command to liquidate ene-
mies of the state.
But that edict was fundamentally incompatible with the Con-
* Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Hofstra Uni-
versity School of Law; B.A., Yale University, 1975; M.A., Victoria University of Welling-
ton (New Zealand), 1977; J.D., Yale University, 1979.  Since 2002, Professor Freedman
has served as a consultant to numerous legal teams involved in challenges to the gov-
ernment’s post-9/11 detention policies.
1 6o Minutes: The President’s Story: The President Talks in Detail About his Sept. 11 Expe-
rience (CBS television broadcast Sept. 10, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2002/09/11/60II/main521718.shtml (quoting President Bush’s recollection of how
he reacted to Chief of Staff Andrew Card’s initial news of the World Trade Center
attacks by saying “We’re at war . . .”).
2 Id. (President Bush recalling himself thinking “I didn’t need any legal briefs, I
didn’t need any consultations, I knew we were at war,” and telling the Secretary of
Defense that “we’re going to find out who did this and . . . [we] are going to go get
them.”).  After this Symposium was held, Gonzales, in a speech delivered at the Coast
Guard Academy on September 6, 2007, has offered an account of the events in which
“reaching a law of war framework was thoroughly-debated and fully-discussed.” Pre-
pared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the U.S. Coast Guard
Acad. (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2007/ag_speech_070906.
html.  It does not seem too early to predict that history will not ultimately bear out
this claim.
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stitution.  Whatever powers the Executive exercises, including the
war power, are subject to legal restraints.3  That is precisely what is
meant by a government of laws.  And, therefore, when the techni-
cal people like Viet Dinh and John Yoo got involved they had the
impossible task of attempting to somehow neutralize laws whose
very purpose was to constrain executive powers.4
The result of its initial failure is that the administration has
gotten neither the benefits that would have flowed from a princi-
pled application of the war model —  for which this country previ-
ously had a high reputation5 —  nor the much greater benefits that
would have resulted from using the criminal justice system to deal
with the individuals involved.
But now, over five years later, we have the remarkable specta-
cle of defenders of the administration attacking its critics for its
own nonfeasance.  In the words of David Rivkind and Lee Casey:
The President’s critics . . . should honestly admit that their dif-
ferences [with him] are, by and large, matters of policy which
can and should be debated as such.  The question is . . . which
legal paradigm—war or law enforcement—makes most sense in
meeting the threat.  Those who believe that captured al Qaeda
operatives should be treated as ordinary criminal defendants
(rather than unlawful enemy combatants), entitled to all of the
rights enjoyed by civilians in the federal and state courts . . .
should acknowledge making a policy choice . . . [and] explain
why they believe this to be right and just, and how they think it
will checkmate al Qaeda.6
Well, better late than never I suppose, and I am more than
happy to explain why I wrote in early 2002 that “conducting such
trials before military tribunals, even if legal, would be tragically mis-
guided public policy.”7  I said then, quoting Edmund Burke in dis-
cussing the American Revolution, that in determining what course
to pursue, the question is not “what a lawyer tells me I may do; but
3 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 (2006) (explaining that the Pres-
ident may not disregard limitations placed on his war powers).
4 Viet Dinh and John Yoo served as Deputy Assistant Attorneys Generals in the
Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice from 2001–2003.  For more
information see ABA, Patriot Debates, http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/patriot
debates/bios (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
5  JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 73–83
(2006).
6 David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Claims and Counterclaims, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5,
2006, at A20.
7 Eric M. Freedman, The Bush Military Tribunals: Where Have We Been? Where Are We
Going?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 14, 16 (2002).
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what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do.”8  So let
me briefly apply those criteria to this issue.9
Suppose the President had said on September 12, 2001:
My friends, a terrible crime has been committed on our soil.  To
the extent that a government sent infiltrators here, we will deal
with that government by wiping it out.  But to the extent that a
small group of murderers thinks it can disrupt our institutions
and cause us to abandon our core values, we will show the world
the contrary.  We will capture them wherever in the world they
are.  We will give them a fair trial, which we will invite Al Jazeera
to broadcast, just as we did when our embassies in Africa were
blown up.  And we will let the world judge whose sort of govern-
ment it would rather live under.
Indeed, in a criminal trial replete with due process, an excel-
lent defense team, and protection of the government’s security
needs, an openly-selected jury in a public trial convicted the em-
bassy bombers but refused to sentence them to death on the
grounds that doing so would create martyrs.10   As a result, those
defendants—like the Blind Sheik, the people accused of planning
to bomb tunnels and bridges in New York, and those who bombed
the World Trade Center in 199311 — are serving long sentences12
and are forgotten.
John Yoo might concede this point but would likely argue that
the criminal process functions to adjudicate past events, not to deal
with ongoing “threats that [have] to be stopped.”13  First of all, that
is not true, as the “bridge and tunnel” case shows.  In fact, law en-
forcement authorities frequently act to forestall future activities.
The available tools include, to take just a few examples, arresting
8 Id. (citing Edmund Burke, Second Speech on Conciliation with America (Mar.
22, 1775)).
9 See generally id. (expanding on a number of these points).
10  KIRSTEN SCHARNBERG, Bulldog, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 2005, (Magazine), at
10.
11 Joseph P. Fried, Sheik Sentenced to Life in Prison in Bombing Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 1996, at A1; Benjamin Weiser, Mastermind Gets Life for Bombing of Trade Center, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at A1; Bruce Fein, Simply Follow the Constitution, A.B.A. J., Sept.
2007, at 39, 40.
12 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming con-
viction, and 240-year sentence, of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef for his role in the 1993 World
Trade Center plot), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 (2003); United States v. Rahman, 189
F.3d 88, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming sentence of life imprisonment for Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman, for his involvement in the conspiracy to kill Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak, and lesser sentences for conspiracy to bomb office buildings, tunnels, and
bridges in New York City), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000).
13 See Adam Liptak, Confession at Guantánamo by 9/11 Mastermind May Aid Other
Qaeda Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at A15.
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people for conspiracy, detaining them for immigration violations,
and holding them as material witnesses while collecting informa-
tion.14  Those are some of the reasons Janet Reno and a number of
other former federal prosecutors filed a brief in the Al Marri case
in the Fourth Circuit, saying that criminal law was perfectly ade-
quate to deal with the present threats.15
To be sure, since an arrested defendant has the right to re-
main silent the government cannot require him to provide infor-
mation, with or without the use of coercion.  But then again, the
overwhelming outcome of all criminal cases is a plea bargain—as
in the John Walker Lindh case—and in a plea bargain the defen-
dant has every incentive to voluntarily provide accurate
information.16
That’s just not good enough, responds James Comey, the U.S.
Attorney who handled the case of Jose Padilla and later served near
the top of the Justice Department.  We were very sure that Padilla
was bent on blowing up buildings, but—take your choice—we ei-
ther “could not use the evidence because of the sources and meth-
ods that generated it,”17 or our evidence was “clear and
convincing,” but maybe not  “beyond reasonable doubt.”18  In
short, we in the executive branch decided that we wished to be free
of legal constraints limiting our power to imprison citizens and
14 This technique was used, for example, in the case of Jose Padilla. See James B.
Comey, Fighting Terrorism and Preserving Civil Liberties, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 403, 414
(2005–2006).
15 Brief for Former Senior Justice Department Officials as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners–Appellants at 9–15, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2006)
(No. 06-7427), 2006 WL 3670673 (providing numerous examples). See also Kelly
Anne Moore, Take Al Qaeda to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2007, at A19 (op-ed by
former federal prosecutor adding further examples).  For an empirical social science
study supporting this conclusion, see MARK S. HAMM, TERRORISM AS CRIME 16 (2007).
16 See Dean E. Murphy, American Taliban Soldier Seeks Less Prison Time, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2004, at A6. Cf. Scott Shane & Mark Mazetti, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at A1
(“As the Bush administration completes secret new rules governing interrogations, a
group of experts advising the intelligence agencies are arguing that the harsh tech-
niques used since the 2001 terrorist attacks are outmoded, amateurish and
unreliable.”).
17 This almost surely means it was coerced, since the government routinely prose-
cutes criminal cases while preserving the secrecy of legitimate intelligence “sources
and methods” utilizing the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 3
§§ 1–13 (2007).  In a variation on this argument, Gonzales asserted in his Coast
Guard Academy speech, supra, note 3, that because “the United States military cannot
be expected to stop fighting the enemy to gather evidence like police officers in a
local murder case,” it could not present a case in criminal court that would comply
with normal evidentiary rules.  The former Attorney General appears not to have read
either United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) or Fed. R. Evid. 807.
18 Comey, supra note 14, at 414.
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therefore unilaterally declared ourselves exempt from judicial re-
view of our decisions.19
All I can say is that Dr. Wen Ho Lee—who you will recall had
“links” to China and whose dealings with the secrets of the hydro-
gen bomb were said to pose a risk of blowing up the planet—is
lucky that he was not designated “an enemy combatant.”20
Certitude is not the test of certainty.  Governments are some-
times, dare I say often, mistaken.  That may be through tyrannical
malice or it may be through incompetence, as in the case of Bran-
don Mayfield who was wrongly connected to the Madrid train
bombings.21  Or it may be through a commendable desire on the
part of executive officials to err on the side of caution.  Whatever
explanation you like, one purpose of due process is to ensure sim-
ple accuracy.
If there might exist some shadowy international plot against
the country, it is important for all concerned to get the facts
straight.  And, contrary to the idea that “on 9/11 everything
changed,” there is nothing in the least bit new about this.  To pick
just a few scattered examples, there was a real Gunpowder Plot in
1605 to blow up the Houses of Parliament, but in an effort to
demonstrate links to Spain many people were tortured and ulti-
19 Is this an overstatement?  Consider the record.  The government suddenly de-
clared Padilla an “enemy combatant” when after holding him in custody for some
time it found itself unable to produce any evidence against him. See Padilla v. Bush,
233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). While Padilla sat incommunicado in a
military brig (just a few weeks before the Supreme Court was to rule on the lawfulness
of his detention), Mr. Comey gave a press conference on Capital Hill accusing Padilla
of involvement in an extraordinarily wide-ranging plot to detonate a “dirty bomb” in
the United States and blow up a number of apartment buildings using natural gas. See
Jerry Seper, Padilla Tied to Apartment Plot; Justice Outlines Bomb Scheme, WASH. TIMES,
June 2, 2004, at A3.  Eventually, the government, in a successful effort to moot a case
that it was destined to lose in the Supreme Court, transferred Padilla back to the
criminal justice system. See Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006) (mem.) (denying
petition for writ of certiorari).  At that point, all the spectacular allegations disap-
peared and he was charged with having traveled overseas from October 1993 to No-
vember 2001 “to receive violent jihad training and to fight violent jihad.” Press
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Jose Padilla Charged with Conspiracy to Murder Individuals
Overseas, Providing Material Support to Terrorists (Nov. 22, 2005), http://www.
usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/November/05_crm_624.html. See Owen Fiss, The War
Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 235, 239–40 (2006).
20 See Matthew Purdy & James Sterngold, The Prosecution Unravels: The Case of Wen
Ho Lee, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at A1 (noting the apology of District Judge upon the
release of Wen Ho Lee).
21  ERIC LICHTBLAU, U.S. Will Pay $2 Million to Lawyer Wrongly Jailed, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2006, at A18. See also Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement
on Brandon Mayfield Case (May 24, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel04/
mayfield052404.htm.
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mately wrongly executed.22  In the so-called Haymarket Massacre of
1886, a bomb was undeniably thrown at police lines during an an-
archist rally in Chicago and seven policemen died.23   But in the
atmosphere of mass hysteria against the international Bolshevik
conspiracy that followed, the resulting trials led to the execution of
four people whom the governor concluded a few years later were
innocent and pardoned posthumously.24  Similarly, in 1920, a huge
bomb concealed in a wagon blew up on Wall Street, killing thirty-
three ordinary passers-by.25  A note was left at the scene by anar-
chists  (and it was an anarchist who had assassinated President Mc-
Kinley in 1901),26 leading the Washington Post to call the event “an
act of war,” supported no doubt by Italy.27  Amid the resulting hys-
terical “Red Scare” and surrounding mass deportations the crimi-
nal trials received by those anarchists that the authorities managed
to capture are ones whose outcomes are still seriously questioned.28
Nor do we need to look deep into the past to know that even when
due process protections do apply, the legal system is fallible: there
have been 124 exonerations of Death Row inmates since 1973.29
The fact that our system is designed to limit the power of exec-
utive officials is not a bug; it is a product feature.  The difference
between a government that acts on what it “knows” and a govern-
ment that is required to prove its charges in adversarial proceed-
ings before a neutral tribunal is the difference between a
government of laws and a police state.  And lawyers who fight to
enforce this difference are not engaged in “lawfare” but in promot-
ing the precise values for which the United States armed forces
22 ANTONIA FRASER, THE GUNPOWDER PLOT: TERROR AND FAITH IN 1605 (1996). See
also A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71 (appeal taken
from Eng.) (speech of Lord Hope of Craighead, ¶ 103).
23 Chicago Public Library, 1886, May 4: The Haymarket Tragedy (1996), http://
www.chipublib.org/004chicago/disasters/haymarket.html.
24 Id.
25 Beverly Gage, The First Wall Street Bomb, Hist. News Serv., Sept. 17, 2001,
http://www.h-net.org/~hns/articles/2001/091701a.html; see also Daniel Gross, Previ-
ous Terror on Wall Street—A Look at a 1920 Bombing, THESTREET.COM, Sept. 20, 2001,
http://www.thestreet.com/comment/ballotdance/10001305.html.
26 See Leroy Parker, The Trial of the Anarchist Murderer Czolgos, 11 YALE L. J.  80
(1901); Sidney Fine, Anarchism and the Assasination of McKinley, 60 Am. Hist. Rev. 777
(1955);  Lona Manning, 9/16: Terrorists Bomb Wall Street, http://crimemagazine.com/
06/wallstreetbomb,0115-6.htm,
27 Gage, supra note 25.
28 CHOICES, WORLD ALMANAC VIDEO, LANDMARK AMERICAN TRIALS (1999), https://
www.choices.web.aplus.net/guidebooks/WAV/SaccoVanzetti.pdf; James Barron, After
1920 Blast, The Opposite of ‘Never Forget,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at B1.
29 Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6 (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
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should be fighting when they go to war in the name of the Ameri-
can people.  To sue the government is not to wage war against it by
other means, but rather to channel what otherwise might be vio-
lent resistance into a form of opposition which legitimates that very
government.30
Does constraining Executive action involve risks?  Of course it
does.  But so does allowing the Nazis to march in Skokie.  If the
Nazis ever gained office they would abolish free speech.  But we
take that risk consciously.31  In a land of free speech Nazis are
much less likely to come to power.32  Conversely, to allow the gov-
ernment to suppress them in order to guard against that risk is
both to sacrifice the vibrancy of discussion on which we stake our
hopes of a better future and to hand our enemies a pre-emptive
victory by becoming like them in order to defeat them.33
As he was leaving office in December 2006, Donald Rumsfeld
said,
I don’t think I would have called it the ‘war on terror.’ . . .  I’ve
worked to reduce the extent to which that [label] is used and
increased the extent to which we understand it more as a . . .
conflict . . . against a relatively small number of terribly danger-
ous and violent extremists.34
That’s the correct definition of the problem.
And perhaps when David Rivkind understands it, he will also
understand the appropriate solution.  But he has not gotten the
30 See generally Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush’s War on the Rule of Law,
HARPER’S MAG., July 2007, at 74, 75 (explaining that “the lawfare doctrine is the con-
ceptual framework that best reveals the degree to which the Bush administration has
effectively declared war on the rule of law itself.”).
31 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672–73 (1925) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.,
dissenting) (“If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning
of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”).
32 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 588 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“Communism has been so thoroughly exposed in this country that it has been crip-
pled as a political force.  Free speech has destroyed it as an effective political party.”).
33 See People v. Huss, 241 Cal. App. 2d 361, 368 (1966) (“Speech is free under the
First Amendment, not so much because free speech is inherently good as because its
suppression is inherently bad.”); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 7 (Vintage Books ed. 1971); Eric M. Freedman, A Rational Constitutional
Faith: Remarks in Response to Professor Amsterdam, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 418–20
(2004–2005); Eric M. Freedman, The People of the State of New York v. Jesse A.
Stump: Dissenting Opinion, in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE RELA-
TIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND VIOLENCE 331 (Monroe H. Freedman & Eric M.
Freedman eds., 1995). See also A v. Secretary of State for Home Department [2004]
UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.) (speech of Lord Hoffmann, ¶¶ 91, 95–96).
34 Cal Thomas, For Rumsfeld, ‘War on Terror’ Is Misleading Label, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12,
2006, at 23.
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message yet.  He says, “The only people who don’t think we’re at
war are the critics.  We think we’re at war and they [the terrorists]
think we’re at war.”35  In other words, if Osama bin Laden (or, I
suppose a right-wing militia like the one that spawned Timothy Mc-
Veigh and the Oklahoma City bombings) declares “war” on the
United States, we should take the bait and play into his hands by
abandoning precisely our greatest strength.
That strength is not our military strength.  Secretary Rumsfeld
ultimately figured out that the United States Armed Forces simply
cannot occupy every inch of the globe.  In fact, at this moment
those forces are stretched perilously thin.36  The policy of waging a
“war on terror,” meaning the use of the military to incapacitate
anyone whose activities strike the administration as contrary to the
national interest,37 is a prescription for bankruptcy on multiple
levels.
To defeat ideologies opposed to ours we will have to win the
hearts and minds of people around the world.38  That requires
demonstrating in deed adherence to our professed ideals.  The Ex-
ecutive’s insistence on arrogating unlimited power has squandered
what is in fact America’s greatest strength: the moral force that
comes from being an example to the world, a country that others
justifiably want to emulate, one confident enough in its own values
that its President wears his amenability to the rule of law “as a re-
35 Liptak, supra note 13, at A15.
36 David S. Cloud, Army Brigade, Long a Symbol of Readiness, Is Stretched Thin, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A1.
For decades, the Army has kept a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division
on round-the-clock alert, poised to respond to a crisis anywhere in 18 to
72 hours.
Today, the so-called ready brigade is no longer so ready. Its soldiers are
not fully trained, much of its equipment is elsewhere, and for the past
two weeks the unit has been far from the cargo aircraft it would need in
an emergency.
Id.
See also, Samantha Power, Our War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., July 29, 2007, at 1,
8.
37 Readers who think this description a caricature might consult In re Guantánamo
Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475–77 (D.D.C. 2005). See Jules Lobel, The Preven-
tive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1421–22 (2007).
38 Cf. David Rieff, Policing Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 22, 2007, at 14 (sug-
gesting that British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has adopted “the terror-as-crime
view” after concluding “that preventing terrorism requires winning the hearts and
minds of actual human beings” and “that the war model has only fueled rage and
resentment within precisely those communities whose support is most essential—the
Muslim diasporas outside the Islamic world”).
2007] WHO’S AFRAID OF THE CRIMINAL LAW PARADIGM 331
publican crown”39 rather than casting it aside in times of stress.
Today, a young person in an authoritarian nation who were
asked to compare the behavior of her government in addressing
perceived security threats with that of ours might well answer—ac-
curately and tragically—that there is not much difference.40  That
is by far the greatest long-term damage that has been done to the
interests of the United States by the terrorism policies of the cur-
rent administration.41
The strongest blow that could be struck against ideologies op-
posed to ours would be the recovery of our commitment to the
rule of law.  “[T]he preservation of . . . [its] safeguards is a power-
ful weapon against our enemies and an inspiration to our
friends.”42
The right way, as well as the genuinely American way, to deal
with “a relatively small number of terribly dangerous and violent
extremists”43 is to prosecute them.
39 See Eric M. Freedman, On Protecting Accountability, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 705
(1999).
40 See Freedman, supra note 7, at 16.
If we are indeed at war, what values are we fighting for? Are we now
announcing that when the chips are really down due process is simply
an unaffordable luxury that unacceptably retards reaching a predeter-
mined result?  In that case, why should an ordinary citizen of an Arab
country whose government takes the same view believe that its justice
system is any worse than ours? To abandon our core values in times of
stress is to confess that we lack confidence in them.
Id.
41 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Terrorized by ‘War on Terror’: How a Three-Word Mantra
Has Undermined America, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2007, at  B01; Wesley K. Clark & Kal
Raustiala, Why Terrorists Aren’t Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A19.
42 Freedman, supra note 7, at 19–20.
43 Thomas, supra note 34.

